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Abstract
Current neural network-based classifiers are sus-
ceptible to adversarial examples even in the
black-box setting, where the attacker only has
query access to the model. In practice, the threat
model for real-world systems is often more re-
strictive than the typical black-box model where
the adversary can observe the full output of the
network on arbitrarily many chosen inputs. We
define three realistic threat models that more
accurately characterize many real-world clas-
sifiers: the query-limited setting, the partial-
information setting, and the label-only setting.
We develop new attacks that fool classifiers un-
der these more restrictive threat models, where
previous methods would be impractical or inef-
fective. We demonstrate that our methods are ef-
fective against an ImageNet classifier under our
proposed threat models. We also demonstrate a
targeted black-box attack against a commercial
classifier, overcoming the challenges of limited
query access, partial information, and other prac-
tical issues to break the Google Cloud Vision
API.
1. Introduction
Neural network-based image classifiers are susceptible to
adversarial examples, minutely perturbed inputs that fool
classifiers (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio et al., 2013). These
adversarial examples can potentially be exploited in the real
world (Kurakin et al., 2016; Athalye et al., 2017; Sharif
et al., 2017; Evtimov et al., 2017). For many commercial
or proprietary systems, adversarial examples must be con-
sidered under a limited threat model. This has motivated
black-box attacks that do not require access to the gradient
of the classifier.
One approach to attacking a classifier in this setting trains
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a substitute network to emulate the original network and
then attacks the substitute with first-order white-box meth-
ods (Papernot et al., 2016a; 2017). Recent works note
that adversarial examples for substitute networks do not
always transfer to the target model, especially when con-
ducting targeted attacks (Chen et al., 2017; Narodytska &
Kasiviswanathan, 2017). These works instead construct ad-
versarial examples by estimating the gradient through the
classifier with coordinate-wise finite difference methods.
We consider additional access and resource restrictions on
the black-box model that characterize restrictions in real-
world systems. These restrictions render targeted attacks
with prior methods impractical or infeasible. We present
new algorithms for generating adversarial examples that
render attacks in the proposed settings tractable.
1.1. Definitions
At a high level, an adversarial example for a classifier is an
input that is slightly perturbed to cause misclassification.
Prior work considers various threat models (Papernot et al.,
2016b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). In this work, we consider
`∞-bounded perturbation that causes targeted misclassifi-
cation (i.e. misclassification as a given target class). Thus,
the task of the adversary is: given an input x, target class
yadv , and perturbation bound , find an input xadv such that
||xadv − x||∞ <  and xadv is classified as yadv .
All of the threat models considered in this work are addi-
tional restrictions on the black-box setting:
Black-box setting. In this paper, we use the definition of
black-box access as query access (Chen et al., 2017; Liu
et al., 2017; Hayes & Danezis, 2017). In this model, the
adversary can supply any input x and receive the predicted
class probabilities, P (y|x) for all classes y. This setting
does not allow the adversary to analytically compute the
gradient ∇P (y|x) as is doable in the white-box case.
We introduce the following threat models as more limited
variants of the black-box setting that reflect access and re-
source restrictions in real-world systems:
1. Query-limited setting. In the query-limited setting,
the attacker has a limited number of queries to the
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classifier. In this setting, we are interested in query-
efficient algorithms for generating adversarial exam-
ples. A limit on the number of queries can be a result
of limits on other resources, such as a time limit if in-
ference time is a bottleneck or a monetary limit if the
attacker incurs a cost for each query.
Example. The Clarifai NSFW (Not Safe for Work)
detection API1 is a binary classifier that outputs
P (NSFW |x) for any image x and can be queried
through an API. However, after the first 2500 pre-
dictions, the Clarifai API costs upwards of $2.40 per
1000 queries. This makes a 1-million query attack, for
example, cost $2400.
2. Partial-information setting. In the partial-
information setting, the attacker only has access to the
probabilities P (y|x) for y in the top k (e.g. k = 5)
classes {y1, . . . , yk}. Instead of a probability, the clas-
sifier may even output a score that does not sum to 1
across the classes to indicate relative confidence in the
predictions.
Note that in the special case of this setting where
k = 1, the attacker only has access to the top la-
bel and its probability—a partial-information attack
should succeed in this case as well.
Example. The Google Cloud Vision API2 (GCV) only
outputs scores for a number of the top classes (the
number varies between queries). The score is not a
probability but a “confidence score” (that does not
sum to one).
3. Label-only setting. In the label-only setting, the
adversary does not have access to class probabilities
or scores. Instead, the adversary only has access to
a list of k inferred labels ordered by their predicted
probabilities. Note that this is a generalization of the
decision-only setting defined in Brendel et al. (2018),
where k = 1, and the attacker only has access to the
top label. We aim to devise an attack that works in
this special case but can exploit extra information in
the case where k > 1.
Example. Photo tagging apps such as Google Pho-
tos3 add labels to user-uploaded images. However, no
“scores” are assigned to the labels, and so an attacker
can only see whether or not the classifier has inferred
a given label for the image (and where that label ap-
pears in the ordered list).
1https://clarifai.com/models/
nsfw-image-recognition-model-
e9576d86d2004ed1a38ba0cf39ecb4b1
2https://cloud.google.com/vision/
3https://photos.google.com/
1.2. Contributions
Query-efficient adversarial examples. Previous meth-
ods using substitute networks or coordinate-wise gradient
estimation for targeted black-box attacks require on the or-
der of millions of queries to attack an ImageNet classi-
fier. Low throughput, high latency, and rate limits on com-
mercially deployed black-box classifiers heavily impact the
feasibility of current approaches to black-box attacks on
real-world systems.
We propose the variant of NES described in Salimans et al.
(2017) (inspired by Wierstra et al. (2014)) as a method for
generating adversarial examples in the query-limited set-
ting. We use NES as a black-box gradient estimation tech-
nique and employ PGD (as used in white-box attacks) with
the estimated gradient to construct adversarial examples.
We relate NES in this special case with the finite differ-
ence method over Gaussian bases, providing a theoretical
comparison with previous attempts at black-box adversar-
ial examples. The method does not require a substitute net-
work and is 2-3 orders of magnitude more query-efficient
than previous methods based on gradient estimation such
as Chen et al. (2017). We show that our approach reli-
ably produces targeted adversarial examples in the black-
box setting.
Adversarial examples with partial information. We
present a new algorithm for attacking neural networks in
the partial-information setting. The algorithm starts with an
image of the target class and alternates between blending in
the original image and maximizing the likelihood of the tar-
get class. We show that our method reliably produces tar-
geted adversarial examples in the partial-information set-
ting, even when the attacker only sees the top probability.
To our knowledge, this is the first attack algorithm pro-
posed for this threat model.
We use our method to perform the first targeted attack on
the Google Cloud Vision API, demonstrating the applica-
bility of the attack on large, commercial systems: the GCV
API is an opaque (no published enumeration of labels),
partial-information (queries return only up to 10 classes
with uninterpretable “scores”), several-thousand-way com-
mercial classifier.
Adversarial examples with scoreless feedback. Often,
in deployed machine learning systems, even the score is
hidden from the attacker. We introduce an approach for
producing adversarial examples even when no scores of any
kind are available. We assume the adversary only receives
the top k sorted labels when performing a query. We in-
tegrate noise robustness as a proxy for classification score
into our partial-information attack to mount a targeted at-
tack in the label-only setting. We show that even in the
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decision-only setting, where k = 1, we can mount a suc-
cessful attack.
2. Approach
We outline the key components of our approach for con-
ducting an attack in each of the proposed threat models.
We begin with a description of our application of Natu-
ral Evolutionary Strategies (Wierstra et al., 2014) to enable
query-efficient generation of black-box adversarial exam-
ples. We then show the need for a new technique for attack
in the partial-information setting, and we discuss our algo-
rithm for such an attack. Finally, we describe our method
for attacking a classifier with access only to a sorted list of
the top k labels (k ≥ 1). We have released full source code
for the attacks we describe 4.
We define some notation before introducing the approach.
The projection operator Π[x−,x+](x′) is the `∞ projection
of x′ onto an -ball around x. When x is clear from context,
we abbreviate this as Π(x′), and in pseudocode we denote
this projection with the function CLIP(x′, x− , x+ ). We
define the function rank(y|x) to be the smallest k such that
y is in the top-k classes in the classification of x. We use
N and U to represent the normal and uniform distributions
respectively.
2.1. Query-Limited Setting
In the query-limited setting, the attacker has a query bud-
get L and aims to cause targeted misclassification in L
queries or less. To attack this setting, we can use “stan-
dard” first-order techniques for generating adversarial ex-
amples Goodfellow et al. (2015); Papernot et al. (2016b);
Madry et al. (2017); Carlini & Wagner (2017), substitut-
ing the gradient of the loss function with an estimate of the
gradient, which is approximated by querying the classifier
rather than computed by autodifferentiation. This idea is
used in Chen et al. (2017), where the gradient is estimated
via pixel-by-pixel finite differences, and then the CW at-
tack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) is applied. In this section,
we detail our algorithm for efficiently estimating the gradi-
ent from queries, based on the Natural Evolutionary Strate-
gies approach of Wierstra et al. (2014), and then state how
the estimated gradient is used to generate adversarial ex-
amples.
2.1.1. NATURAL EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES
To estimate the gradient, we use NES (Wierstra et al.,
2014), a method for derivative-free optimization based on
the idea of a search distribution pi(θ|x). Rather than max-
imizing an objective function F (x) directly, NES maxi-
4https://github.com/labsix/limited-
blackbox-attacks
mizes the expected value of the loss function under the
search distribution. This allows for gradient estimation
in far fewer queries than typical finite-difference methods.
For a loss function F (·) and a current set of parameters x,
we have from Wierstra et al. (2014):
Epi(θ|x) [F (θ)] =
∫
F (θ)pi(θ|x) dθ
∇xEpi(θ|x) [F (θ)] = ∇x
∫
F (θ)pi(θ|x) dθ
=
∫
F (θ)∇xpi(θ|x) dθ
=
∫
F (θ)
pi(θ|x)
pi(θ|x)∇xpi(θ|x) dθ
=
∫
pi(θ|x)F (θ)∇x log (pi(θ|x)) dθ
= Epi(θ|x) [F (θ)∇x log (pi(θ|x))]
In a manner similar to that in Wierstra et al. (2014), we
choose a search distribution of random Gaussian noise
around the current image x; that is, we have θ = x + σδ,
where δ ∼ N (0, I). Like Salimans et al. (2017), we
employ antithetic sampling to generate a population of
δi values: instead of generating n values δi ∼ N (0, I),
we sample Gaussian noise for i ∈ {1, . . . , n2 } and set
δj = −δn−j+1 for j ∈ {(n2 + 1), . . . , n}. This optimiza-
tion has been empirically shown to improve performance of
NES. Evaluating the gradient with a population of n points
sampled under this scheme yields the following variance-
reduced gradient estimate:
∇E[F (θ)] ≈ 1
σn
n∑
i=1
δiF (θ + σδi)
Finally, we perform a projected gradient descent update
(Madry et al., 2017) with momentum based on the NES
gradient estimate.
The special case of NES that we have described here can be
seen as a finite-differences estimate on a random Gaussian
basis.
Gorban et al. (2016) shows that for an n-dimensional space
and N randomly sampled Gaussian vectors v1 . . . vN , we
can lower bound the probability that N random Gaussians
are c-orthogonal:
N≤−e c
2n
4 ln (p)
1
2 =⇒ P
{
vi · vj
||vi||||vj || ≤ c ∀ (i, j)
}
≥ p
Considering a matrix Θ with columns δi, NES gives the
projection Θ(∇F ), so we can use standard results from
concentration theory to analyze our estimate. A more com-
plex treatment is given in Dasgupta et al. (2006), but using
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Algorithm 1 NES Gradient Estimate
Input: Classifier P (y|x) for class y, image x
Output: Estimate of∇P (y|x)
Parameters: Search variance σ, number of samples n,
image dimensionality N
g ← 0n
for i = 1 to n do
ui ← N (0N , IN ·N )
g ← g + P (y|x+ σ · ui) · ui
g ← g − P (y|x− σ · ui) · ui
end for
return 12nσ g
a straightforward application of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Theorem, we can upper and lower bound the norm of our
estimated gradient ∇̂ in terms of the true gradient ∇. As
σ → 0, we have that:
P
{
(1−δ)||∇||2 ≤ ||∇̂||2 ≤ (1+δ)||∇||2
}
≥ 1− 2p
where 0 < δ < 1 and N = O(−δ−2 log(p))
More rigorous analyses of these “Gaussian-projected fi-
nite difference” gradient estimates and bounds (Nesterov
& Spokoiny, 2017) detail the algorithm’s interaction with
dimensionality, scaling, and various other factors.
2.1.2. QUERY-LIMITED ATTACK
In the query-limited setting, we use NES as an unbiased,
efficient gradient estimator, the details of which are given
in Algorithm 1. Projected gradient descent (PGD) is per-
formed using the sign of the estimated gradient:
x(t) = Π[x0−,x0+](x
(t−1) − η · sign(gt))
The algorithm takes hyperparameters η, the step size, and
N , the number of samples to estimate each gradient. In
the query-limited setting with a query limit of L, we use N
queries to estimate each gradient and perform LN steps of
PGD.
2.2. Partial-Information Setting
In the partial-information setting, rather than beginning
with the image x, we instead begin with an instance x0
of the target class yadv , so that yadv will initially appear in
the top-k classes.
At each step t, we then alternate between:
(1) projecting onto `∞ boxes of decreasing sizes t cen-
tered at the original image x0, maintaining that the adver-
sarial class remains within the top-k at all times:
t = min 
′ s.t. rank
(
yadv|Π′(x(t−1))
)
< k
Algorithm 2 Partial Information Attack
Input: Initial image x, Target class yadv , Classifier
P (y|x) : Rn×Y → [0, 1]k (access to probabilities for y
in top k), image x
Output: Adversarial image xadv with ||xadv−x||∞ ≤ 
Parameters: Perturbation bound adv , starting pertur-
bation 0, NES Parameters (σ,N, n), epsilon decay δ,
maximum learning rate ηmax, minimum learning rate
ηmin
← 0
xadv ← image of target class yadv
xadv ← CLIP(xadv, x− , x+ )
while  > adv or maxy P (y|x) 6= yadv do
g ← NESESTGRAD(P (yadv|xadv))
η ← ηmax
xˆadv ← xadv − ηg
while not yadv ∈ TOP-K(P (·|xˆadv)) do
if η < ηmin then
← + δ
δ ← δ/2
xˆadv ← xadv
break
end if
η ← η2
xˆadv ← CLIP(xadv − ηg, x− , x+ )
end while
xadv ← xˆadv
← − δ
end while
return xadv
(2) perturbing the image to maximize the probability of the
adversarial target class,
x(t) = arg max
x′
P (yadv|Πt−1(x′))
We implement this iterated optimization using backtrack-
ing line search to find t that maintains the adversarial class
within the top-k, and several iterations of projected gradi-
ent descent (PGD) to find x(t). Pseudocode is shown in
Algorithm 2. Details regarding further optimizations (e.g.
learning rate adjustment) can be found in our source code.
2.3. Label-Only Setting
Now, we consider the setting where we only assume access
to the top-k sorted labels. As previously mentioned, we
explicitly include the setting where k = 1 but aim to design
an algorithm that can incorporate extra information when
k > 1.
The key idea behind our attack is that in the absence of
output scores, we find an alternate way to characterize the
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success of an adversarial example. First, we define the dis-
cretized score R(x(t)) of an adversarial example to quan-
tify how adversarial the image is at each step t simply based
on the ranking of the adversarial label yadv:
R(x(t)) = k − rank(yadv|x(t))
As a proxy for the softmax probability, we consider the ro-
bustness of the adversarial image to random perturbations
(uniformly chosen from a `∞ ball of radius µ), using the
discretized score to quantify adversariality:
S(x(t)) = Eδ∼U [−µ,µ][R(x(t) + δ)]
We estimate this proxy score with a Monte Carlo approxi-
mation:
Ŝ(x(t)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
R(x(t) + µδi)
A visual representation of this process is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1. An illustration of the derivation of the proxy score Sˆ in
the label-only setting.
We proceed to treat Ŝ(x) as a proxy for the output probabil-
ities P (yadv|x) and use the partial-information technique
we introduce in Section 2.2 to find an adversarial example
using an estimate of the gradient∇xŜ(x).
3. Evaluation
We evaluate the methods proposed in Section 2 on their ef-
fectiveness in producing targeted adversarial examples in
the three threat models we consider: query-limited, partial-
information, and label-only. First, we present our evalua-
tion methodology. Then, we present evaluation results for
our three attacks. Finally, we demonstrate an attack against
a commercial system: the Google Cloud Vision (GCV)
classifier.
3.1. Methodology
We evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks against an
ImageNet classifier. We use a pre-trained InceptionV3 net-
work (Szegedy et al., 2015) that has 78% top-1 accuracy,
Threat model Success rate Median queries
QL 99.2% 11,550
PI 93.6% 49,624
LO 90% 2.7× 106
Table 1. Quantitative analysis of targeted  = 0.05 adversarial at-
tacks in three different threat models: query-limited (QL), partial-
information (PI), and label-only (LO). We perform attacks over
1000 randomly chosen test images (100 for label-only) with ran-
domly chosen target classes. For each attack, we use the same
hyperparameters across all images. Here, we report the overall
success rate (percentage of times the adversarial example was
classified as the target class) and the median number of queries
required.
and for each attack, we restrict our access to the classifier
according to the threat model we are considering.
For each evaluation, we randomly choose 1000 images
from the ImageNet test set, and we randomly choose a
target class for each image. We limit `∞ perturbation to
 = 0.05. We use a fixed set of hyperparameters across all
images for each attack algorithm, and we run the attack un-
til we produce an adversarial example or until we time out
at a chosen query limit (e.g. L = 106 for the query-limited
threat model).
We measure the success rate of the attack, where an attack
is considered successful if the adversarial example is clas-
sified as the target class and considered unsuccessful oth-
erwise (whether it’s classified as the true class or any other
incorrect class). This is a strictly harder task than produc-
ing untargeted adversarial examples. We also measure the
number of queries required for each attack.
3.2. Evaluation on ImageNet
In our evaluation, we do not enforce a particular limit on
the number of queries as there might be in a real-world
attack. Instead, we cap the number of queries at a large
number, measure the number of queries required for each
attack, and present the distribution of the number of queries
required. For both the the partial-information attack and
the label-only attack, we consider the special case where
k = 1, i.e. the attack only has access to the top label. Note
that in the partial-information attack the adversary also has
access to the probability score of the top label.
Table 1 summarizes evaluation results our attacks for the
three different threat models we consider, and Figure 2
shows the distribution of the number of queries. Figure 3
shows a sample of the adversarial examples we produced.
Table 2 gives our hyperparameters; for each attack, we use
the same set of hyperparameters across all images.
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Figure 2. The distribution of the number of queries required for
the query-limited (top) and partial-information with k = 1 (bot-
tom) attacks.
Figure 3.  = 0.05 targeted adversarial examples for the
InceptionV3 network. The top row contains unperturbed images,
and the bottom row contains corresponding adversarial examples
(with randomly chosen target classes).
General
σ for NES 0.001
n, size of each NES population 50
, l∞ distance to the original image 0.05
η, learning rate 0.01
Partial-Information Attack
0, initial distance from source image 0.5
δ, rate at which to decay  0.001
Label-Only Attack
m, number of samples for proxy score 50
µ, `∞ radius of sampling ball 0.001
Table 2. Hyperparameters used for evaluation
3.3. Real-world attack on Google Cloud Vision
To demonstrate the relevance and applicability of our ap-
proach to real-world systems, we attack the Google Cloud
Vision (GCV) API, a publicly available computer vision
suite offered by Google. We attack the most general object
labeling classifier, which performs n-way classification on
images. Attacking GCV is considerably more challenging
than attacking a system in the typical black-box setting be-
cause of the following properties:
• The number of classes is large and unknown — a full
enumeration of labels is unavailable.
• The classifier returns “confidence scores” for each la-
bel it assigns to an image, which seem to be neither
probabilities nor logits.
• The classifier does not return scores for all labels, but
instead returns an unspecified-length list of labels that
varies based on image.
This closely mirrors our partial-information threat model,
with the additional challenges that a full list of classes is
unavailable and the length of the results is unspecified and
varies based on the input. Despite these challenges, we suc-
ceed in constructing targeted adversarial examples against
this classifier.
Figure 4 shows an unperturbed image being correctly la-
beled as several skiing-related classes, including “skiing”
and “ski.” We run our partial-information attack to force
this image to be classified as “dog” (an arbitrarily chosen
target class). Note that the label “dog” does not appear in
the output for the unperturbed image. Using our partial-
information algorithm, we initialize our attack with a pho-
tograph of a dog (classified by GCV as a dog) and success-
fully synthesize an image that looks like the skiers but is
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Figure 4. The Google Cloud Vision Demo labeling on the unper-
turbed image.
Figure 5. The Google Cloud Vision Demo labeling on the ad-
versarial image generated with `∞ bounded perturbation with
 = 0.1: the image is labeled as the target class.
classified as “dog,” as shown in Figure 5 5.
4. Related work
Biggio et al. (2012) and Szegedy et al. (2013) discovered
that machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples. Since then, a number of techniques have been
developed to generate adversarial examples in the white-
box case (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2017; Hayes & Danezis, 2017), where an attacker has full
access to the model parameters and architecture.
In this section, we focus on prior work that specifically ad-
dress the black-box case and practical attack settings more
generally and compare them to our contributions. Through-
out this section, it is useful to keep in the mind the axes for
comparison: (1) white-box vs. black-box; (2) access to
train-time information + query access vs. only query ac-
cess; (3) the scale of the targeted model and the dataset it
was trained on (MNIST vs. CIFAR-10 vs. ImageNet); (4)
untargeted vs. targeted.
5https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
1h9bU7WBTUg demonstrates our algorithm transforming
the image of a dog into an image of the skier while retaining the
original classification
4.1. Black-box adversarial attacks
Several papers have investigated practical black-box at-
tacks on real-world systems such as speech recognition sys-
tems (Carlini et al., 2016), malware detectors (Hu & Tan,
2017; Xu et al., 2016), and face recognition systems (Sharif
et al., 2017). Current black-box attacks use either substitute
networks or gradient estimation techniques.
4.1.1. BLACK-BOX ATTACKS WITH SUBSTITUTE
NETWORKS
One approach to generating adversarial examples in the
black-box case is with a substitute model, where an ad-
versary trains a new model with synthesized data labeled
by using the target model as an oracle. Adversarial exam-
ples can then be generated for the substitute with white-
box methods, and they will often transfer to the target
model, even if it has a different architecture or training
dataset (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015).
Papernot et al. (2016a; 2017) have successfully used this
method to attack commercial classifiers like the Google
Cloud Prediction API, the Amazon Web Services Oracle,
and the MetaMind API, even evading various defenses
against adversarial attacks. A notable subtlety is that the
Google Cloud Vision API 6 we attack in this work is not
the same as the Google Cloud Prediction API 7 (now the
Google Cloud Machine Learning Engine) attacked in Pa-
pernot et al. (2016a; 2017). Both systems are black-box,
but the Prediction API is intended to be trained with the
user’s own data, while the Cloud Vision API has been
trained on large amounts of Google’s own data and works
“out-of-the-box.” In the black-box threat model we con-
sider in our work, the adversary does not have access to the
internals of the model architecture and has no knowledge
of how the model was trained or what datasets were used.
Papernot et al. (2016a; 2017) trained the Cloud Predic-
tion API with small datasets like MNIST and successfully
demonstrated an untargeted attack. As Liu et al. (2017)
demonstrated, it is more difficult to transfer targeted ad-
versarial examples with or without their target labels, par-
ticularly when attacking models trained on large datasets
like ImageNet. Using ensemble-based methods, Liu et al.
(2017) overcame these limitations to attack the Clarifai
API. Their threat model specifies that the adversary does
not have any knowledge of the targeted model, its training
process, or training and testing data, matching our defini-
tion of black-box. While Liu et al.’s substitute network at-
tack does not require any queries to the target model (the
models in the ensemble are all trained on ImageNet), only
18% of the targeted adversarial examples generated by the
ensemble model are transferable in the Clarifai attack. In
6https://cloud.google.com/vision/
7https://cloud.google.com/prediction/docs/
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contrast, our method needs to query the model many times
to perform a similar attack but has better guarantees that an
adversarial example will be generated successfully (94%
even in the partial-information case, and over 99% in the
standard black-box setting).
4.1.2. BLACK-BOX ATTACKS WITH GRADIENT
ESTIMATION
Chen et al. (2017) explore black-box gradient estimation
methods as an alternative to substitute networks, where
we have noted that transferability is not always reliable.
They work under the same threat model, restricting an
adversary solely to querying the target model as an or-
acle. As they note, applying zeroth order optimization
naively in this case is not a tractable solution, requiring
2× 299× 299× 3 = 536406 queries to estimate the gradi-
ents with respect to all pixels. To resolve this problem, they
devise an iterative coordinate descent procedure to decrease
the number of evaluations needed and successfully perform
untargeted and targeted attacks on MNIST and CIFAR-10
and untargeted attacks on ImageNet. Although we do not
provide a direct comparison due to the incompability of the
`2 and `∞ metric as well as the fixed-budget nature of the
optimization algorithm in Chen et al. (2017), our method
takes far fewer queries to generate imperceptible adversar-
ial examples.
Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan (2017) propose a black-
box gradient estimation attack using a local-search based
technique, showing that perturbing only a small fraction of
pixels in an image is often sufficient for it to be misclassi-
fied. They successfully perform targeted black-box attacks
on an ImageNet classifier with only query access and ad-
ditionally with a more constrained threat model where an
adversary only has access to a “proxy” model. For the most
successful misclassification attack on CIFAR-10 (70% suc-
cess) the method takes 17,000 queries on average. Targeted
adversarial attacks on ImageNet are not considered.
4.2. Adversarial attacks with limited information
Our work is concurrent with Brendel et al. (2018), which
also explores the label-only case using their “Boundary At-
tack,” which is similar to our two-step partial information
algorithm. Starting with an image of the target adversarial
class, they alternate between taking steps on the decision
boundary to maintain the adversarial classification of the
image and taking steps towards the original image.
4.3. Other adversarial attacks
Several notable works in adversarial examples use simi-
lar techniques but with different adversarial goals or threat
models. Xu et al. (2016) explore black-box adversarial ex-
amples to fool PDF malware classifiers. To generate an
adversarial PDF, they start with an instance of a malicious
PDF and use genetic algorithms to evolve it into a PDF that
is classified as benign but preserves its malicious behavior.
This attack is similar in spirit to our partial-information al-
gorithm, although our technique (NES) is more similar to
traditional gradient-based techniques than evolutionary al-
gorithms, and we consider multiway image classifiers un-
der a wider set of threat models rather than binary classi-
fiers for PDFs. Nguyen et al. (2014) is another work that
uses genetic algorithms and gradient ascent to produce im-
ages that fool a classifier, but their adversarial goal is dif-
ferent: instead of aiming to make a interpretable image of
some class (e.g. skiiers) be misclassified as another class
(e.g. a dog), they generate entirely unrecognizable images
of noise or abstract patterns that are classified as a paricu-
lar class. Another work generates adversarial examples by
inverting the image instead of taking local steps; their goal
is to show that CNNs do not generalize to inverted images,
rather than to demonstrate a novel attack or to consider a
new threat model (Hosseini et al., 2017).
5. Conclusion
Our work defines three new black-box threat models that
characterize many real world systems: the query-limited
setting, partial-information setting, and the label-only set-
ting. We introduce new algorithms for attacking classifiers
under each of these threat models and show the effective-
ness of these algorithms by attacking an ImageNet classi-
fier. Finally, we demonstrate targeted adversarial examples
for the Google Cloud Vision API, showing that our meth-
ods enable black-box attacks on real-world systems in chal-
lenging settings. Our results suggest that machine learning
systems remain vulnerable even with limited queries and
information.
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